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Standard non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental 
agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful 
cooperation: only small coalitions are stable that achieve only little. However, there also 
exist IEAs with higher participation and more success. In order to explain this 
phenomenon, this paper departs from the standard assumption of joint welfare 
maximization of coalition members, implying ambitious abatement targets and strong 
free-riding. Instead, it considers that countries agree on modest emission reduction 
targets. This may sufficiently raise participation so that the success of treaties improves 
in terms of global emission reduction and global welfare. Thus, modesty may pay, 
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1. Introduction 
Standard non-cooperative game theoretical analyses of international environmental agree-
ments (IEAs) draw a rather pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation 
between countries.
1 A large amount of the literature came to this conclusion in a two-stage 
game by applying the concept of internal and external stability.
2 In the first stage, countries 
decide whether they become a member of an IEA or remain a non-signatory. In the second 
stage, they decide on their emission level. Given the choices of the second stage, an IEA is 
called stable if no signatory has an incentive to leave the agreement and no non-signatory has 
an incentive to join the coalition. For the second stage, it is assumed that signatories choose 
emission levels that maximize the aggregate welfare to the coalition. Non-signatories play as 
singletons and choose their emissions that are optimal under autarky.  
The equilibrium coalition depends on a number of assumptions.
3 The "standard model" 
assumes that countries´ welfare function comprise benefits (also sometimes called revenues) 
from individual emissions and damage costs from global emissions
4, signatories and non-
signatories choose their emissions simultaneously (Nash-Cournot assumption) and there are 
no transfers. For a large set of specific welfare functions, it turns out that the equilibrium 
number of signatories is small and therefore stable coalitions improve only marginally upon 
the non-cooperative status quo (e.g., Bauer 1992, Botteon/Carraro 1997, Carraro/Siniscalco 
1991 and Hoel 1992). The reason is that the free-rider incentive increases sharply with the 
                                                 
1    More positive results are derived from cooperative game theory. See for instance Chander/ 
Tulkens (1995 and 1997). 
2    Similar conclusions have been derived for repeated games by applying the concept of 
renegotiation-proof strategies. See for instance Barrett (1994a, b and 1999) and Finus/ 
Rundshagen (1998a). 
3   For an extensive overview see Finus (2001) and (2003b).  
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number of signatories and hence internal stability is already violated for small coalitions. 
Clearly, the standard model helps explaining the problems of international cooperation in the 
presence of environmental spillovers, but cannot explain IEAs with high participation like the 
Montreal Protocol or the Framework Convention on Climate Change. This requires a modifi-
cation of the standard assumptions. Important modifications in the literature include the fol-
lowing items: 1) sequential choice of emissions, 2) transfers, 3) commitment, 4) reputation 
effects, 5) issue linkage and 6) minimum participation clause. 
1) A sequential choice of emission levels implies that signatories, acting as Stackelberg lead-
ers, considering the optimal choice of non-signatories, acting as Stackelberg followers 
(Barrett 1994b and 1997a). Consequently, signatories can better take into account possible 
leakage effects caused by non-signatories (as long as countries have no dominant strategy). 
Therefore, the equilibrium number of signatories under the Stackelberg assumption is at least 
as high (and usually higher) as under the Nash-Cournot assumption and coalition formation is 
more successful. However, the Stackelberg assumption is not innocuous for three reasons. 
First, as it is well known from industrial economics, there is the open question how players 
can credibly commit to be a Stackelberg leader. Second, it is difficult to justify why signato-
ries should have a strategic advantage over non-signatories, which is particular true in a model 
with symmetric countries as assumed for instance in Barrett (1994b). Third, this assumption 
implies for internal stability that a signatory looses its strategic advantage when it leaves the 
treaty and becomes a non-signatory. 
2) In the context of asymmetric welfare functions, transfers can help to increase participation 
in and success of IEAs (Botteon/Carraro 1997, Carraro/Siniscalco 1993 and Barrett 1997b). 
However, also the assumption of transfers in these models is not innocuous since it neglects 
                                                                                                                                                         
4   An alternative specification of this model with the same qualitative results assumes countries´ 
strategies to be abatement from some base emission level and welfare comprises benefits from  
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free-rider problems between donors and recipients (Finus 2002), free-rider problems within 
the group of donors (Barrett 1994a), as well as other incentive problems described in Mäler 
(1990). That these problems are important in reality is evident by recalling that only some 
"modern" IEAs like the Montreal Protocol and the Convention of Biological Diversity have 
provisions for transfers but that the backlog of payments under these protocols is large (Finus 
2003b). 
3) In Botteon/Carraro (1997), Carraro/Siniscalco (1993), Jeppesen/Andersen (1998) and 
Petrakis/Xepapadeas (1996) it is shown that if some countries are committed to cooperation 
irrespective of their free-rider incentive and compensate non-signatories for participation, 
cooperation will be more successful. Apart from the fact this result follows (almost) trivially 
from the assumption, it is evident that commitment is not compatible with the notion of self-
enforcing IEAs of non-cooperative game theory as pointed out by Carraro/Siniscalco (1993). 
4) Jeppesen/Andersen (1998) and Hoel/Schneider (1997) assume that non-signatories receive 
disutility from being outsiders (loss of reputation) where disutility increases with the number 
of countries signing an IEA. They find that the higher the disutility of being an outsider, the 
larger the equilibrium coalition will be. Again, it seems that this result is almost implied by 
assumption, though I would not deny that reputation effects may play some role in actual 
international treaty making. However, given the withdrawal of the US from the Kyoto Proto-
col, doubts remain whether reputation effects are strong enough to overcome the incentives of 
countries to pursue their self-interests. 
5) Barrett (1997b), Botteon/Carraro (1998), Carraro/Siniscalco (1997) and Katsoulacos (1997) 
have demonstrated that if the public good agreement IEA is linked to a club agreement, like a 
trade agreement or a research and development agreement, participation in IEAs can be 
                                                                                                                                                         
global abatement and costs from individual abatement.   
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raised.
5 Issue linkage implies that countries can only enjoy the benefits from the club good 
agreement if they also join an IEA. However, most reported instances of issue linkage (e.g., 
Ragland 1995) do not include multilateral agreements involving many countries but only 
bilateral agreements. This might be due to at least two reasons. First, package deals involving 
many countries will be associated with high transaction costs. Second, in reality, it will be 
difficult to exclude countries from trade agreements or defense pacts just because they did not 
sign an IEA.  
6) Carraro/Marchiori/Oreffice (2003) demonstrate that the implementation of a minimum par-
ticipation clause can help to increase the success of IEAs. Such a clause implies that a treaty 
only enters into force if a certain number of signatories have ratified it. It seems that this 
extension of the base model is very fruitful since it helps to explain the frequent application of 
minimum participation clauses in almost all IEAs in the past.  
Taken together, I acknowledge that extensions of the “standard model” capture interesting 
aspects of international environmental treaty making, though not all of them appear to be con-
vincing either on empirical or theoretical grounds.
6 In particular, it seems that an obvious 
extension has not received sufficient attention yet, namely a modification of the assumption of 
joint welfare maximization. This is surprising since casual empirical evidence suggests that 
coalition members neither choose their individual emission reductions cost-efficiently nor the 
sum of individual emission reductions is optimal for the coalition. On the one hand, abate-
ment obligations of many IEAs are specified as (cost-inefficient) uniform emission reduction 
                                                 
5   Similar positive results have been obtained in the context of repeated games. See for instance 
Cesar/de Zeeuw (1996), Folmer/van Mouche/Ragland (1993), Folmer/van Mouche (1994) and 
Ragland (1995). 
6   An other recent modification that I do not mention since it is not directly related to my model 
involves the possibility to form multiple coalitions. See for instance Carraro/Marchiori (2003), 
Finus (2003a) and Finus/Rundshagen (2003).  
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quotas despite countries face different marginal abatement costs.
7 On the other hand, in many 
IEAs and in particular in framework conventions, the global abatement level is below optimal 
levels.
8 Both observations have been partly rationalized in models that assume that countries 
bargain either on the level of an efficient uniform tax rate or on an inefficient uniform emis-
sion reduction quota and agree on the smallest proposal (least common denominator rule). In 
Endres (1996 and 1997), it is shown that the bargaining outcome under the quota regime may 
be superior from an ecological and economic point of view in a two-country model. Later 
papers have confirmed the superiority of the quota over the tax regime in a repeated game 
framework. An inefficient though more symmetric allocation of emission reduction under the 
quota regime is compensated by higher stability (Endres/Finus 2002 and Finus/Rundshagen 
1998b) and higher participation (Finus/Rundshagen 1998a). Also moderate abatement targets, 
as implied by the least common denominator rule, are compensated under both regimes by a 
higher participation (Finus/Rundshagen 1998a). The tradeoff between the level of emission 
reduction and participation in favor of participation has also been stressed in a later paper by 
Barrett (2003).  
                                                 
7   The list of examples is long and includes the Helsinki Protocol, which suggested a 30 percent 
reduction of sulfur emissions from 1980 levels by 1993. Moreover, the "Protocol Concerning the 
Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or Their Transboundary Fluxes" signed in Sofia in 1988 
called on countries to uniformly freeze their emissions at 1987 levels by 1995 and the "Protocol 
Concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or Their Fluxes" signed in 
Geneva in 1991 required parties to reduce 1988 emissions by 30 percent by 1999. 
8   For framework conventions, like the Vienna Convention preceding the Montreal Protocol on 
CFC-reductions, the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) preceding the Kyoto 
Protocol on greenhouse gases reduction or the Convention Long Range Transboundary Pollution 
(LRTAP) preceding the Helsinki and Oslo Protocols on sulfur reductions, this is evident because 
they are only declarations of intentions without abatement obligations. However, this conclusion 
is also supported by empirical studies on the Montreal Protocol (Murdoch/Sandler 1997b), the 
Helsinki Protocol (Murdoch/Sandler 1997a), the Oslo Protocol (Finus/Tjøtta 2003), or the Kyoto 
Protocol (Böhringer/Vogt 2002).  
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In this paper, I exclusively focus on the effect of moderate emission reduction on the success 
of coalition formation like in Barrett (2003). Hence, I also stick to the simple assumption of 
symmetric countries and ignore transfers. Unlike this and the other papers mentioned above, 
however, I analyze the effect of moderate emission reduction on participation, global emis-
sions and global welfare not in a repeated but in a two-stage stage game, defining stability of 
an IEA in terms of internal&external stability. Moreover, unlike Barrett (2003), I do not 
restrict attention to the grand coalition in the case of moderate emission reduction and, unlike 
the other papers mentioned above, the “degree of moderation” is chosen endogenously. 
In what follows, I first lay out the standard model assuming joint welfare maximization in 
section 2. I call this “the classical case” with “ambitious emission reduction”. Subsequently, I 
analyze what changes if countries agree on “moderate emission reduction”. I call this “the 
non-classical case”. Section 4 analyzes equilibrium conditions under which countries will 
agree on a moderate and not on an ambitious reduction scheme. Section 5 summarizes the 
main findings and points to future research questions. 
2.  The Classical Case 
Let there be N symmetric countries and consider the following welfare function of country 





B(x ) d x
=
π= −∑  
where I assume as in Hoel/Schneider (1997) a strictly convex benefit function from individual 
emissions,  i x , (
'
i B(x) 0 > , 
''
i B( x) 0 < ), a linear damage cost function from global emissions, 
i x ∑ , with constant marginal damages d>0, and 
max
ii x( 0 , x] ∈ . Let n denote the number of 
signatories and 





x max B(x ) d (n x (N n) x  −⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅    
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which leads to the first order condition of a signatory: 
[3] 
'
i B(x) d n =⋅ . 
A non-signatory 
NS iI ∈  (which is equivalent to 
S iI ∉  because 
SN S II I ∪=  and 
SN S II ∩= ∅ ) 
simply maximizes [1] which leads to: 
[4] 
'
i B(x) d = . 
Since  n1 ≥  and d>0, it suffices for an interior equilibrium to require that 
max
i x  is sufficiently 
large and that 
'
i B(x 0 ) d n =≥ ⋅ . Due to constant marginal damages, countries have a dominant 
strategy and hence there exists a unique emission vector for any n[ 1 , N ] ∈ . Signatories choose 
S
i x (n), which decreases in the number of participants (
S
i x( n ) /n 0 ∂∂ < ), and non-signatories 
choose 
N
i x , irrespective of n. Thus, global emissions, 
TS N
ii xn x ( n ) ( N n ) x =⋅ + − ⋅ , decrease in 
the number of signatories, 
T x/n 0 ∂∂ < . Therefore, a non-signatory´s welfare, 
NN T
ii B(x ) d x π= −⋅ , increases with the number of participants (
N
i /n 0 ∂π ∂ > ) because dam-
ages decrease with n. However, also a signatory´ s welfare, 
SS T
ii B(x (n)) d x π= −⋅ , increases 
with n (
S




x m a x ( nn )( nn )  +⋅ π+  >
ii
1S 1 2 N
ii
xx max n (n ) n max    ⋅π + ⋅ π     where 
1 n  is the number of 
signatories before and 
12 nn +  after 
2 n  non-signatories have joined the agreement, and, due to 
symmetry, 
S1
i (n ) π <
N1
i (n ) π , and, hence, 
S1 2
i (n n ) π+>
S1
i (n ) π  must be true (though 
S1 2
i (n n ) π+<
N1
i (n ) π  is possible).  
The equilibrium number of signatories follows from the condition of internal and external 
stability: 
[5] internal  stability: 
SN
ii (n) (n 1) π≥ π −
S iI ∀∈  and   
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[6] external  stability: 
NS
ii (n) (n 1) π> π +
S iI ∀∉  . 
That is, no signatory should be better off by leaving the agreement with n members to become 
a non-signatory so that there are only n-1 signatories left. By the same token, no non-signa-
tory should have an incentive to join the coalition of n members to become a signatory in a 
coalition of n+1 members. For the further analysis, it is helpful to define as in Hoel/Schneider 
(1997) the function 
SN
iii (n) (n) (n 1) Φ= π− π− , noting that internal stability implies  i(n) 0 Φ≥  
S iI ∀∈  and external stability  i(n) 0 Φ<  








b ax x d x
2 =
 π= ⋅ − − 





bln(x ) d x
=
π= −∑  . 
Figure 1: Function  i(n) Φ Φ Φ Φ  for Two Examples 








Function [7] implies that  i(n) Φ  is strictly concave and [8] that  i(n) Φ  is strictly convex.
9 For 
[7], the equilibrium number of signatories is 
* n3 =  and for [8], it is 
* n2 = . That is, 
* n  is the 
largest integer equal or smaller than  i(n) 0 Φ= .  
For the further analysis it is important to note that [1] implies  i(n 2) Φ=>0 and that a suffi-
cient condition that  i(n) Φ  is strictly decreasing for n2 ≥  is 
´´´
i B( x ) 0 ≥  as shown in 
Hoel/Schneider (1997) in their appendix. I assume for the remainder 
´´´
i B( x ) 0 ≥  and thus 
* n[ 2 , N ] ∈ . Since 
S
i π  and 
N
i π  increase in n as mentioned above and because n=1 corresponds 
to the “classical Nash equilibrium” and n=N to the “classical social optimum”, global welfare 
in 
* n  will be higher than in the Nash equilibrium and lower (equal if 
* nN = ) than in the 
social optimum. By the same token, global emission in 
* n  will be lower than in the Nash 
equilibrium and higher (equal if 
* nN = ) than in the social optimum since 
S
i x  decreases in n 
and 
NS
i x  remains constant as mentioned above. 
3. The  Non-Classical  Case 
A simple way of capturing the idea of moderate emission reduction is to assume that signato-





x max B(x ) d (n x (N n) x  −α⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅   
with  1 α≤ , and hence a signatory´ s first order condition is 
[10] 
'
i B(x) d n =α⋅ ⋅ . 
                                                 
9   A sufficient condition for 
'
i B(x) 0 > , 
max
ii x( 0 , x] ∈  for welfare function [7] is 
max
i xa = . In order 
to ensure  i x0 ≥  we need b dn/a ≥  since 
NS
ii xx( b a d n ) / b >= − . For welfare function [8], we  
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Therefore, comparing [10] with [3], 
SS
ii x( n ) x(, n ) ≤α if  1 α≤  as I assume henceforth. The 
advantage of this approach is that moderate emission reduction is not only assumed for a par-
ticular n, e.g., 
* n , but consistently for all n. For non-signatories nothing changes. It seems 
sensible to require 
SN
ii x(, n ) x α≤ as an upper bound for 
S
i x(, n ) α , implying that α cannot be 
too small.  
In order to study the effect of moderate emission reductions on 
* n,  I  i n s e r t  
S
i x(, n ) α , 
S
i x(, n 1 ) α− and 
N
i x  in welfare function [1] and compute 
SN
iii (n) (n) (n 1) Φ= π− π−  that I 
denote 
S
ii ( ,n) ( ,n) Φα = πα −
N
i (, n1 ) πα−. This gives:  
[11] 
SS N
ii i i ( ,n) B(x ( ,n)) d (n x ( ,n) (N n) x )  Φα = α −⋅ ⋅ α + − ⋅ −   
    
NS N
ii i B(x ) d ((n 1) x ( ,n 1) (N n 1) x )  −⋅ −⋅ α − + −+⋅   . 
Clearly, 
SS
ii (, n ) ( n ) πα ≤ π  for a given n because 
S
i x (n) (and not 
S
i x(, n ) α ) maximizes a signa-
tory´s welfare function. Also 
NN
ii (, n1 ) ( n1 ) πα−≤ π − since 
SS
ii x( n 1 ) x(, n 1 ) −≤ α− implies 
higher environmental damages for free-riders. Hence, it is not immediately evident whether 
i(, n ) Φα  lies above or below  i(n) Φ . Therefore, we differentiate the components of [11] with 






(, n ) d n
(1 )









(, n1 ) d( n1 )
B( x( ,n 1 )




                                                                                                                                                          
require  b dn ≥  for  i x0 ≥  since 
NS
ii x x (b dn)/dn >=−  and 
max
i x( b d ) / d ≥−  because 
N




i B( x( ,n ) 0 α< , 
S
i (, n ) / 0 ∂π α ∂α >  for  1 α<  and 
S
i (, n ) / 0 ∂π α ∂α ≤  for 1 α≥ . 
N
i (, n1 ) / 0 ∂π α − ∂α >  because 
'' S
i B( x( ,n 1 ) 0 α−< . This is shown in Figure 2 where 
S
i (, n ) πα  
and 
N
i (, n1 ) πα− are drawn as a function of α.
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Figure 2: Welfare of Signatories and Free-riders as a Function of α 
a) 
* nn =          b )  












i (, n )
N





Figure 2a assumes 
* nn =  and hence 
S
i (, n ) πα =
N
i (, n1 ) πα− for  1 α=  whereas Figure 2b 
assumes 
* nn >  and hence 
S
i (, n ) πα <
N
i (, n1 ) πα− for  1 α= .
11 In any case, in order to establish 
i(, n ) Φα > i(n) Φ , we require that 
N
i (, n1 ) πα− decreases faster than 
S
i (, n ) πα  if we lower α 
from  1 α=  as shown in Figure 2. More formally, we need that for  1 α<  
S
i (, n ) / ∂π α ∂α <  
N
i (, n1 ) / ∂π α − ∂α  holds. Using [12], this implies: 
                                                 
10   It can be shown along the procedure described in Appendix 1 that 
2N 2
i (, n 1 ) / 0 ∂π α − ∂ α <  and 
2S 2







nB ( x ( , n )
(1 )





First, note that the right hand sight term is larger or equal to 1 and hence a conservative 
assumption is 1. Second, note that 
22 n/ ( n 1 ) −  decreases in n. Since we know that in the 
classical case 
* n2 ≥ , a conservative assumption is n2 =  in [13]. Thus, [13] is satisfied in any 
case for 
L 3/4 α≥α = . Consequently,  i(, n ) Φα  lies above  i(n) Φ  for any 13 / 4 >α≥  and 
any  n2 ≥ . In fact, if we let 
12 1 ... 3/4 >α >α > > , then 
12
ii i ( n )( , n )( , n ) Φ< Φ α< Φ α<  
i ... (3/4,n) <Φ .
12 Consequently, we can conclude that 
** 1 * 2 * n n( ) n( ) . . . n( 3 / 4 ) <α ≤α ≤ ≤ . 
However, as long as we have no information on the functional form of  i(, n ) Φα , we cannot 
establish a complete sequence of strict inequality signs because we cannot rule out functions 








                                                                                                                                                          
11   Without loss of generality, we ignore integer constraints in the following analysis. 
12   Of course, if we know as in the case of welfare function [7] that 
* n3 =  in the classical case, then 
stronger conclusions are possible because then  i(, n ) Φα  lies above  i(n) Φ  for any 
* nn ≥  
and
L 5/9 α≥α = .  
 13





















Clearly, a sufficient condition for 
** 1 * 2 * n n( ) n( ) . . . n( 3 / 4 ) <α <α < <  is that  i(, n ) Φα  is 
either a strictly concave or a strictly decreasing function as this is true for instance for welfare 
functions [7] and [8], respectively (see Appendix 2). Moreover, in order to establish a strict 
sequence for any α without the lower bound 
L 3/4 α= , we need 
L /n 0 ∂α ∂ < . Thus, from 










B( x( ,n )
g:













As shown in Appendix 3, this holds for welfare function [7] and [8]. Summarizing our find-
ings leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1 
Let 
* n  denote the equilibrium number of signatories in the classical case and 
* n( ) α  in the 
non-classical case with moderate emission reductions, and let 
12 1 ... αα >>> , then  
a) 
** 1 * 2 n n ( ) n ( ) ... αα <≤≤   for 13 / 4 α >≥ . 
b) 
** 1 * 2 n n ( ) n ( ) ... αα <<<   for 13 / 4 α >≥  and if  i(, n ) Φα  is either a strictly concave or a 
strictly decreasing function. 
c) 
** 1 * 2 n n ( ) n ( ) ... αα <<<  if  i(, n ) Φα  is either a strictly concave or a strictly decreasing 
function and if g/k=1 or  (g/k)/ n 0 ∂∂ ≥ , which is satisfied for instance for welfare function 
[7] and [8]. 
Proof: See the arguments developed above and Appendix 1 to 3. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 1 is illustrated for welfare function [7] and [8] in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4: Functions  i(n) Φ Φ Φ Φ  and  i(, n ) Φα Φα Φα Φα  for Two Examples 
a)  Welfare  Function  [7]     b)  Welfare  Function  [8] 






















For welfare function [8], with  i(, n ) Φα  strictly decreasing,  i(, n ) Φα  lies always above  i(n) Φ  
with 
12
ii i ( n )( , n )( , n ) Φ< Φ α< Φ α,
12 1 ... >α >α > . For welfare function [7], with  i(, n ) Φα  
strictly concave, 
12
ii i ( n )( , n )( , n ) Φ< Φ α< Φ α is only true for 
L 5/9 α≥  at 
* nn 3 ==  but  
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since  (g/k)/ n 0 ∂∂ ≥ , 
L α  decreases continuously if we move along the n-axis (e.g., 
L 7/16 α≥  at n=4). 
In a next step, we analyze how moderate emission reductions affect global emissions. Clearly, 
at 
* nn = , global emissions would be higher for moderate emission reductions since 
SS
ii x( n ) x(, n ) ≤α (recalling that 
NN
ii x( n ) x(, n ) =α  because of dominant strategies). However, 
1 α< , implies 
** nn ( ) <α  as shown above. Hence, in the non-classical equilibrium, there are 
less non-signatories that emit 
NS
ii xx ( , n ) ≥α, or as we may write now 
NS *
ii xx ( n ( ) ) ≥α  to indi-
cate that 
* n  depends on α. Consequently, if the increase in the number of signatories is suffi-
ciently large, this may compensate for moderate emission reductions and hence global emis-
sions may be lower in the non-classical than in the classical equilibrium. Whether this is actu-
ally true, is difficult to conclude at a general level, but can be established for specific func-
tions. For instance, for our two examples we find: 
Proposition 2 
For welfare function [7] and [8] (where 
** 1 * 2 n n ( ) n ( ) ... αα <<< , 
12 1 ... αα >>> , holds), 
global emissions decrease when lowering α  until the maximum participation is reached.  
Proof:  A sufficient condition that global emissions decrease if we lower α is 
S*
i x( n) ≥ 
S*1 S*2
ii x( n( ) ) x( n( ) ) . . . α≥ α≥, 
12 1 ... >α >α > , which I prove in Appendix 4 for welfare func-
tion [7] and [8]. Q.E.D. 
From Proposition 2, it follows that from an ecological point of view, we should lower α until 
the maximum participation is reached, but not below this value.
13  
                                                 
13    Depending on the number of countries N and the specific welfare function, maximum 
participation may either imply full participation (if N is not too big) or only partial cooperation if 
we consider that α  cannot become too small because of the constraint 
SN
ii x(, n ) x α≤.  
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Another pending question is how moderate emission reduction affects global welfare. The 
global effect comprises the effect on former non-signatories in the classical case that are also 
non-signatories in the non-classical case (group 1), former non-signatories that are now sig-
natories (group 2) and former signatories that are still signatories (group 3). For group 1, it is 
evident that this depends solely on global emissions since they choose 
N
i x  in both cases. That 
is, these countries will be better off (worse off) in the non-classical case if global emission 
decrease (increase) because their environmental damages decrease (increase). For group 2 and 
3, conclusions are more difficult since not only damages but also benefits are affected. Never-
theless, as Proposition 3 demonstrates, clear-cut results can be derived at the aggregate level 
under rather mild conditions. 
Proposition 3 
Suppose global emissions decrease and the number of signatories increases when lowering α  
(as this is true for instance for welfare function [7] and [8]), then global welfare increases 
when lowering α  until the maximum participation is reached.  
Proof: Consider two equilibria 
*1 n( ) α <
*2 n( ) α  with 
12 α> α and global emissions 
T*1 x( n( ) ) α >
T*2 x( n( ) ) α . Let individual emissions of signatories be 
S*1 N
ii x( n( ) ) x α≤  and 
S* 2 N
ii x( n( ) ) x α<. Suppose first that we hold global emission constant when moving from 
*1 n( ) α  to 
*2 n( ) α . Consequently, signatories have to choose 
S# * 2
i x( n ( ) ) α  where 
S*1 S #* 2 N
ii i x( n( ) ) x ( n( ) ) x α< α< . Thus, former non-signatories in 
*1 n( ) α  that are now signato-
ries in 
*2 n( ) α  reduce emissions and former signatories that are still signatories increase emis-
sions. Thus, due to non-constant marginal benefits, aggregate benefits of these two groups of 
countries will have increased and hence also aggregate welfare increases of these two groups 
(since damages remain constant). Suppose now that we lower 
S# * 2
i x( n ( ) ) α  to the level 
S*2
i x( n( ) ) α . Since 
SS S N
ii i i B(x ) d (n x (N n) x ) π= −⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅  is a strictly concave function in 
S




i x( n( ) ) α  is above the level that maximizes 
S
i π , aggregate welfare of these two groups 
will increase further. Clearly, because 
T*1 x( n( ) ) α >
T*2 x( n( ) ) α , non-signatories´ welfare will 
also increase. Q.E.D. 
Thus, moderate emission reduction, associated with higher participation and lower global 
emissions, increases global welfare because of two reasons. First, lower global emissions 
imply lower individual and aggregate environmental damages. Second, aggregate benefits 
increase because the emission reduction burden is shouldered by more countries. 
4. Equilibrium  Analysis 
Reviewing Proposition 1 to 3 together, it remains to draw some conclusions about possible 
equilibria. For the discussion, two cases may be distinguished. In the first case, we may 
assume that, initially, no coalition exists. Hence, in a first step, countries have to decide 
whether to remain in this situation or form a coalition. If they form a coalition, then, in a 
second step, they have the choice between the classical and non-classical case where in the 
latter case they can choose between various forms of a moderate emission reduction scheme 
through the choice of the level of α. The decision in the first step is easy to predict: countries 
will cooperate in any case since they either choose a moderate emission scheme if 
S* S*
ii (n ) (n ( )) π< πα  for some α or the classical emission scheme if 
S* S*
ii (n ) (n ( )) π> π α  for all 
α but we know from section 2 that 
S* S N
ii i ( n ) ( n1 ) ( n1 ) π> π = = π =  and 
* n[ 2 , N ] ∈ . Hence, we 
can conclude that there will be some cooperation in equilibrium.  
Proposition 4 
Suppose that initially no coalition exists, then countries will cooperate in any case, imple-
menting either an ambitious (classical case) or a moderate emission reduction scheme (non-
classical case). Global welfare will be higher and global emissions lower than in the absence 
of cooperation.  
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Proof: See the arguments above. For global emissions this follows trivially from 
S* N
ii x( n( ) ) x α< , 
S* N
ii x( n) x < , 
* n( ) 1 α> and 
* n1 > . For global welfare in the classical 
scheme, this has been shown in section 2 and if the non-classical case scheme is implemented, 
N
i (n 1) π= =
S
i (n 1) π= <
S* S*
ii (n ) (n ( )) π< πα  holds by assumption and 
N* S*
ii (n ( )) (n ( )) πα > πα  
must be true since 
S* N
ii x( n( ) ) x α<  and therefore non-signatories have higher benefits but the 
same damages as signatories. Q.E.D. 
The decision in the second step is more difficult to predict at a general level. First, we do not 
know whether a  1 α<  exists for which 
S* S*
ii (n ) (n ( )) π< πα  is true. Second, suppose that such 
a α exists, which is not unlikely given the fact that moderate emission reduction imply more 
signatories (see Proposition 1a) and a more equal distribution of emission reduction burdens 
as argued in the proof of Proposition 3. Then, however, it is nevertheless possible that 
T* T* x( n) x( n( ) ) <α  and hence 
N*
i (n ) π >
N*
i (n ( )) πα . This may even imply 
T* T* (n ) (n ( )) π> π α  
where 
T π  denotes total welfare. Third, to make things even worth, even if a 
# α  with 
*# n( ) α  
exists for which 
T* T*# (n ) (n ( )) π< πα  and 
T* T*# x( n) x( n( ) ) >α  is true, we do not know 
whether countries settle for this or some other globally inferior 
* α . In contrast, under the 
assumption of Proposition 3, things are straightforward (see also footnote 13): 
Proposition 5 
Suppose that initially no coalition exists. 
a)  If global welfare and the number of participants increase when lowering α , then coun-
tries will implement a moderate emission reduction scheme. This will be the scheme with 
highest (possible) participation and global welfare (given the contraint of stability).  
b)  If global emissions decrease and the number of participants increases when lowering α  
(as this is true for instance for welfare function [7] and [8]), then countries will imple-
ment a moderate emission reduction scheme. This will be the scheme with highest (possi- 
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ble) participation and global welfare and lowest global emissions (given the contraint of 
stability). 
Proof: a) We show that 
T* (n ) π <
T* (n ( )) πα  is only possible if and only if 
S*
i (n ) π <
S*
i (n ( )) πα  
holds. A repeated application of this proof by letting 
12 1 ... >α >α > , replacing 
* n b y  
*1 n( ) α  
and 
* n( ) α  by 
*2 n( ) α , gives that 
T*1 (n ( ) πα <
T*2 (n ( )) πα <…. is only possible if and only if 
S*1
i (n ( ) πα <
S* 2
i (n ( )) πα <… holds. Suppose 
T* (n ) π <
T* (n ( )) πα  and 
S*
i (n ) π >
S*
i (n ( )) πα  
would be true. This is only possible if 
N*
i (n ) π <
N*
i (n ( )) πα , which requires 
T* T* x( n) x( n() ) >α . Consequently, environmental damages would drop and hence 
S*
i (n ) π >
S*
i (n ( )) πα  is only possible if 
S*
i x( n) >
S*
i x( n( ) ) α  was to hold. Moreover, since 
*S *N *
iii (n ) (n ) (n 1) 0 Φ= π− π− =  and 
*S *N *
iii (n ( )) (n ( )) (n ( ) 1) 0 Φα = πα − π α − =  by definition, 
this requires that 
N*
i (n 1) π− >
N*
i (n ( ) 1) πα −  and consequently that 
T* x( n 1 ) − <
T* x( n() 1 ) α−  
must hold. Thus, it remains to be shown that 
S*
i x( n) >
S*
i x( n( ) ) α  and 
T* x( n 1 ) − < 
T* x( n() 1 ) α−  is not possible. From the first order conditions of 
* n  and 
* n( ) α  signatories 
'S* *
i B(x (n) ) n d =⋅  and 
'S* *
i B (x (n ( ))) n ( ) d α= α ⋅α ⋅ , 
S*
i x( n) >
S*
i x( n( ) ) α  requires α> 
** n/ n() α  (and hence 
* n<
* n( ) α  m u s t  b e  t r u e  b e c a u s e   1 α< ). However, 
** n/ n() α>  
** (n 1)/(n ( ) 1) −α −  and hence from the first order conditions of 
* n1 −  and 
* n( ) 1 α− signato-
ries 
'S*
i B(x (n 1 ) ) −=
* (n 1) d −⋅ and 
'S*
i B(x (n( ) 1 ) ) α− =
* (n ( ) 1) d α⋅ α − ⋅ , 
S*
i x( n 1 ) − > 
S*
i x( n( ) 1 ) α−  follows, which makes 
T* x( n 1 ) − <
T* x( n() 1 ) α−  impossible. To see this note 
that the last inequality would imply:  
*S * *N
ii (n 1) x (n 1) (N n 1) x −⋅ −+ − +⋅ <
*S * *N
ii ( n ()1 )x ( n ()1 ) ( N n ()1 )x α− ⋅ α− + − α+ ⋅ . Since 
S*
i x( n 1 ) − >
S*
i x( n( ) 1 ) α− , we may substitute 
S*
i x( n 1 ) −  for 
S*
i x( n( ) 1 ) α− . Rearranging terms 
gives: 
NS *
ii xx ( n 1 ) <−  which is false by assumption.  
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b) We show that 
T* x( n) >
T* x( n() ) α  implies 
S*
i (n ) π <
S*
i (n ( )) πα . Thus, we prove that 
T* x( n) >
T* x( n() ) α  and 
S*
i (n ) π >
S*
i (n ( )) πα  is not possible which is exactly what we have 
done under a) above. Since 
T* x( n) >
T* x( n() ) α  implies 
N*
i (n ) π <
N*
i (n ( )) πα  global welfare 
will be higher in 
* n( ) α  than in 
* n . Again, a repeated application of this proof by letting 
12 1 ... >α >α >  is obvious. Q.E.D. 
In the second case, we may alternatively assume that a coalition already exists where signato-
ries choose emissions as in the classical case. Then, the question arises whether signatories 
have an incentive to switch to a moderate emission reduction scheme and if so to which. 
However, even more important is the question whether some or all non-signatories have an 
incentive to join the coalition under a new scheme. A first partial answer to this question is 
provided in Proposition 6. 
Proposition 6 
Suppose that initially a coalition of 
* n  members exists (classical case). Then former non-
signatories will join the coalition under a moderate emission reduction scheme so that 
** n( ) n α > ,  1 α < , if and only if global emissions decrease. The new equilibrium 
* n( ) α  
constitutes a Pareto-improvement. 
Proof: Suppose that global emissions would remain constant or increase after additional 
countries have joined the coalition. Then damages of a former non-signatory, say j, that would 
become a signatory would remain constant or increase. Due to 
S* N
jj x( n( ) ) x α< , its benefits 
would decrease and hence also its welfare. Consequently, accession would be irrational. Thus, 
T* T* x( n) x( n() ) >α  must be true if j joins so that 
** n( ) n α> . Hence, former and current non-
signatories, say k, benefit from the accession in any case because of lower damages, i.e., 
N* N*
kk (n ) (n ( )) π< π α . Former signatories, say i, will also benefit because: a) 
S* N*
ij (n ) (n ) π< π  
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holds due to symmetry, b) 
S* N*
jj (n ( )) (n ) πα > π  must hold for a former non-signatory that is 
now a signatory, otherwise accession would not be irrational, and c) 
S* S*
ji (n ( )) (n ( )) πα = πα  
holds due to symmetry. Q.E.D. 
From Proposition 6 we can conclude that whenever a non-signatory is prepared to join the 
coalition under a moderate emission reduction scheme, this is also in the interest of signato-
ries and of other non-signatories. Moreover, it implies that if a coalition already exists, a 
moderate emission reduction scheme is only implemented if and only if it leads to an 
improvement in terms of global emissions and global welfare. This conclusion is stronger 
than under the assumption that no coalition exists initially since it holds not only for the 
assumption of Proposition 5 but generally.
14 That is, no moderate emission reduction scheme 
that is inferior to an ambitious reduction scheme will be implemented if initially a coalition 
exists, whereas this is possible if initially no coalition exists (though ruled out under the con-
ditions of Propositon 5). Despite this clear-cut conclusion, also under the assumption that ini-
tially a coalition exists the question remains whether a moderate emission reduction scheme 
will be implemented and if so which one. Again, a general conclusion is difficult. However, 
under the assumptions listed in Proposition 5, it is evident that 
S*
i (n ( )) πα  increases if we 
lower  α (see the proof of Proposition 5). Hence, non-signatories will accede if α is chosen 
small enough so that 
S* N*
jj (n ( )) (n ) πα > π  holds (and provided N is large enough). For 
instance, for welfare function [7] where 
* n3 =  it turns out that α must be smaller than 0.69 
so that 
S* N*
jj (n ( )) (n ) πα > π  is true. However, since 
* n (0.69) 4.8 ≈  and because 
* n m u s t  b e  a n  
integer value, the threshold of α is actually 0.65 with 
* n (0.65) 5 =  as shown in Figure 5.  
                                                 
14   From the proofs of Proposition 6 it is evident that the result also extents to a sequential coalition 
formation process where α  is successively lowered and the number of signatories successively 
increased.  
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i (n ( ))







i (n ( )) πα  continuously increases when lowering α, signatories will not offer 
0.65 α=  but a lower α that guarantees maximum participation, provided N is larger than 5 
(see footnote 13).
15 Hence, Proposition 5 also holds if initially a coalition of 
* n  members 
exists.  
Taken together, we may conclude that countries will cooperate in any case. It is likely that 
they settle for a moderate emission reduction scheme (non-classical case) that is superior to an 
ambitious emission reduction scheme (classical case) in terms of global welfare and/or global 
emissions. Nevertheless, also moderate targets can only mitigate the free-rider problem but 
                                                 
15   Qualitative similar results can also be derived for welfare function [8].  
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cannot achieve the first best outcome. Even if moderate abatement targets would lead to full 
cooperation, emission levels would be above optimal levels (since 
SS
ii x(, n ) x( n ) α> , 
n[ 2 , N ] ∈ ). Moreover, under the assumption that initially no coalition exists, it cannot be 
generally ruled that countries settle for a moderate emission reduction scheme that is inferior 
to the ambitious reduction scheme.  
5  Summary and Conclusion 
This paper started from the observation that the pessimistic prediction of non-cooperative 
game theoretical models do not always match with real world observations of IEAs. It has 
been argued that one important reason for this difference is the assumption of joint welfare 
maximization that implies the implementation of an ambitious emission reduction target 
among coalition members. Therefore, we analyzed the effect of moderate emission reduction 
targets. It has been shown that modesty may pay: a higher participation may compensate for 
lower abatement targets, so that global emissions may decrease in equilibrium. This has also a 
positive effect on global welfare since abatement burdens are carried by more countries. We 
argued that if initially a small coalition with an ambitious abatement scheme exists, then 
countries will only switch to a moderate abatement scheme if this leads to a Pareto-improve-
ment. In contrast, if initially no coalition exists, then it is possible (though not very likely) that 
countries implement a moderate abatement scheme that is inferior to the ambitious abatement 
scheme. We derived conditions under which these “negative” cases can be ruled out.  
Overall, the model helps to explain why participation in some IEAs is higher than predicted 
by theory. Moreover, it provides some rationale for modest emission reductions as frequently 
observed in reality: in a second best world with no enforcement authority and large free-rider 
incentives, a second best solution may achieve more than an ambitious first best solution.  
The model assumed linear damage cost functions for simplicity, implying dominant strategies. 
However, departing from this assumption would not change the qualitative results. In fact, it  
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would reinforce the positive effect of modest abatement targets. With non-dominant strate-
gies, moderate emissions reductions have additionaly a similar effect as the Stackelberg 
assumption mentioned in the Introduction. Reduced abatement efforts of signatories are 
matched by an increase of abatement efforts of non-signatories. Consequently, larger coali-
tions are stable. Moreover, the positive welfare effect due to a more symmetric allocation of 
abatement burdens involves not only countries that are non-signatories under an ambitious 
scheme and that are signatories under a moderate scheme but also countries that are non-sig-
natories under both regimes. 
Also the assumption of symmetric countries eased the exposition but is not crucial. Since we 
modeled the degree of moderation by assuming that countries consider not the sum of mar-
ginal damages of coalition members but only a fraction α of it (01 ≤α< ), cost-efficiency of 
emission reduction within a coalition of asymmetric players would still be ensured. Hence, 
there is no reason why the positive welfare effect of a moderate scheme may not carry over to 
asymmetric countries. Moreover, in a world of heterogeneous interests, one may expect that 
moderate abatement targets may be even more likely if countries can only agree on the lowest 
common denominator when negotiating abatement targets. 
Literature 
Barrett, S. (1994a), The Biodiversity Supergame. "Environmental and Resource Economics", 
vol. 4, pp. 111-122. 
Barrett, S. (1994b), Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements. "Oxford Eco-
nomic Papers", vol. 46, pp. 804-878. 
Barrett, S. (1997a), Heterogeneous International Agreements. In: C. Carraro (ed.), Interna-
tional Environmental Negotiations: Strategic Policy Issues. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
pp. 9-25. 
Barrett, S. (1997b), The Strategy of Trade Sanctions in International Environmental Agree-
ments. "Resource and Energy Economics", vol. 19, pp. 345-361.  
 26
Barrett, S. (1999), A Theory of Full International Cooperation. "Journal of Theoretical Poli-
tics", vol. 11, pp. 519-541. 
Barrett, S. (2003), Consensus Treaties. “Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics”, 
vol. 158, pp. 529-547. 
Bauer, A. (1992), International Cooperation over Greenhouse Gas Abatement. Mimeo, Semi-
nar für empirische Wirtschaftsforschung, University of Munich, Munich. 
Böhringer C. and Vogt C. (2002). Dismantling of a Breakthrough: The Kyoto Protocol - Just 
Symbolic Policy! Manuscript, ZEW, Mannheim. Forthcoming in European Journal of 
Political Economy. 
Botteon, M. and C. Carraro (1997), Burden-Sharing and Coalition Stability in Environmental 
Negotiations with Asymmetric Countries. In: Carraro, C. (ed.), International Environmental 
Negotiations: Strategic Policy Issues. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham et al., ch. 3, pp. 26-55. 
Botteon, M. and C. Carraro (1998), Strategies for Environmental Negotiations: Issue Linkage 
with Heterogeneous Countries. In: Hanley, N. and H. Folmer (eds.), Game Theory and the 
Global Environment. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham et al., ch. 9, pp. 180-200. 
Carraro, C., C. Marchiori and S. Oreffice (2003) Endogenous Minimum Participation in Inter-
national Environmental Treaties. Working Paper No. 113.2003, Fondazione Eni Enrico 
Mattei, Milano. 
Carraro C. and C. Marchiori (2003), Stable Coalitions. In: Carraro, C. (ed.), Endogenous 
Formation of Economic Coalitions. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, ch. 5, pp. 156-198. 
Carraro, C. and D. Siniscalco (1991), Strategies for the International Protection of the Envi-
ronment. Working Paper, March 1991, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano.  
Carraro, C. and D. Siniscalco (1993), Strategies for the International Protection of the Envi-
ronment. "Journal of Public Economics", vol. 52, pp. 309-328. 
Carraro, C. and D. Siniscalco (1997), R&D Cooperation and the Stability of International 
Environmental Agreements. In: C. Carraro (ed.), International Environmental Negotiations. 
Strategic Policy Issues. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 71-96. 
Cesar, H. and A. de Zeeuw (1996), Issue Linkage in Global Environmental Problems. In: 
Xepapadeas, A., Economic Policy for the Environment and Natural Resources: Techniques 
for the Management and Control of Pollution. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham and Brookfield, 
ch. 7, pp. 158-173. 
Chander, P. and H. Tulkens (1995), A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative 
Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution. "International Tax and Public Finance", vol.  2, 
pp. 279-293. 
Chander, P. and H. Tulkens (1997), The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental 
Externalities. "International Journal of Game Theory", vol. 26, pp. 379-401.   
 27
Endres, A. (1996), Designing a Greenhouse Treaty: Some Economic Problems. In: Eide, E. 
and R. van den Bergh (eds.), Law and Economics of the Environment. Juridisk Forlag, Oslo, 
pp. 201-224. 
Endres, A. (1997), Negotiating a Climate Convention - The Role of Prices and Quantities. 
"International Review of Law and Economics", vol. 17, pp. 201-224. 
Endres, A. and M. Finus (2002), Quotas May Beat Taxes in a Global Emission Game. "Tax 
and Public Finance", vol. 9, pp. 687-707. 
Finus, M. (2001), Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation. Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham. 
Finus, M. (2002), Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation: Any Practical 
Application? In: Böhringer, C., M. Finus and C. Vogt (eds.), Controlling Global Warming: 
Perspectives from Economics, Game Theory and Public Choice. Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK, ch. 2. 
Finus, M. (2003a), New Developments in Coalition Theory: An Application to the Case of 
Global Pollution. In: Marsiliani, L., Rauscher, M. and Withagen, C. (eds), Environmental 
Policy in an International Perspective. Kluwer, Dordrecht, Holland, 2003, pp. 19-49. 
Finus, M. (2003b), Stability and Design of International Environmental Agreements: The 
Case of Global and Transboundary Pollution. In: Folmer, H. and T. Tietenberg (eds), Inter-
national Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics 2003/4. Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK, ch. 3, pp. 82-158. 
Finus, M. and B. Rundshagen (1998a), Toward a Positive Theory of Coalition Formation and 
Endogenous Instrumental Choice in Global Pollution Control. "Public Choice", vol.  96, 
pp. 145-186. 
Finus, M. and B. Rundshagen (1998b), Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in Global Emission 
Game When Players Are Impatient. "Journal of Environmental and Resource Economics", 
vol. 12, pp. 275-306. 
Finus, M. and B. Rundshagen (2003), Endogenous Coalition Formation in Global Pollution 
Control. A Partition Function Approach. In: Carraro, C. (ed.), Endogenous Formation of 
Economic Coalitions. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, ch. 6, pp. 199-243. 
Finus, M. and S. Tjøtta (2003), The Oslo Protocol on Sulfur Reduction: The Great Leap For-
ward? “Journal of Public Economics", vol. 87, pp. 2031-2048.  
Folmer, H., P. van Mouche and S. Ragland (1993), Interconnected Games and International 
Environmental Problems. "Environmental and Resource Economics", vol. 3, pp. 313-335.  
Folmer, H., and P. van Mouche (1994), Interconnected Games and International Environ-
mental Problems II. "Annals of Operations Research", vol. 54, pp. 97-117.  
Hoel, M. (1992), International Environment Conventions: The Case of Uniform Reductions of 
Emissions. "Environmental and Resource Economics", vol. 2, pp. 141-159.  
 28
Hoel, M. and K. Schneider (1997), Incentives to Participate in an International Environmental 
Agreement. "Environmental and Resource Economics", vol. 9, pp. 153-170. 
Jeppesen, T. and P. Andersen (1998), Commitment and Fairness in Environmental Games. In: 
Hanley, N. and H. Folmer (eds.), Game Theory and the Environment. Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK, ch. 4, pp. 65-83. 
Katsoulacos, Y. (1997), R&D Spillovers, Cooperation, Subsidies and International Agree-
ments. In: Carraro, C. (ed.), International Environmental Negotiations: Strategic Policy Is-
sues. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, ch. 6, pp. 97-109. 
Mäler, K.-G. (1990), International Environmental Problems. "Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy", vol. 6, pp. 80-108.  
Murdoch, J.C. and T. Sandler (1997a), Voluntary Cutbacks and Pretreaty Behavior: The Hel-
sinki Protocol and Sulfur Emissions. "Public Finance Review", vol. 25, pp. 139-162. 
Murdoch, J.C. and T. Sandler (1997b), The Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good: the 
Case of Reduced CFC Emissions and the Montreal Protocol. "Journal of Public Economics" 
vol. 63, pp. 331-349. 
Petrakis, E. and A. Xepapadeas (1996), Environmental Consciousness and Moral Hazard in 
International Agreements to Protect the Environment. "Journal of Public Economics", 
vol. 60, pp. 95-110. 
Ragland, S. E. (1995), International Environmental Externalities and Interconnected Games. 
Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Colorado, Boulder. 
 
Appendix 1 
In order to study the effect of α on 
S
ii ( ,n) ( ,n) Φα = πα −
N
i (, n1 ) πα− we note that  
[A1] 
SS S N
ii i i ( ,n) B(x ( ,n)) d (n x ( ,n) (N n) x ) πα = α −⋅ ⋅ α + − ⋅  and  
 
NNS N
iii i (, n1 )B ( x)d ( ( n1 ) x (, n1 )( Nn1 ) x) πα−= −⋅ −⋅ α−+ −+⋅  
as described in the text in equation [11]. Differentiation of 
S
i (, n ) πα  and 
N
i (, n1 ) πα− with 
respect to α, holding n constant, gives: 





( ,n) B(x ( ,n)) x ( ,n)) x ( ,n))
dn
x( x(, n ) )
∂π α ∂ α ∂ α ∂ α
=⋅ − ⋅ ⋅
∂α ∂ α ∂α ∂α
 and  
 b)   
Ns
ii (, n1 ) x (, n1 ) )
d( n 1 )
∂π α − ∂ α −
=− ⋅ − ⋅
∂α ∂α




i B/ x ∂∂  by 
' B  the first order conditions of n signatories and of n-1 signatories read: 
[A3] a)   
'S
i B(x ( ,n) ) d n α= α ⋅ ⋅    and   b)  
'S
i B (x ( , n 1)) d (n 1) α− = α ⋅ ⋅− .  
Differentiating [A3] a) and b) with respect to α and using the theorem of implicit functions 
gives: 





dn x(, n ) )









d ( n1 ) x (, n1 ) )





Substitution of [A4] a) and [A3] a) into [A2] a) and of [A4] b) into [A2] b) gives [12] in the 
text. 
Appendix 2 
We claim in the text that  i(, n ) Φα  is strictly concave for welfare function [7] and strictly 
decreasing for welfare function [8] for any α and hence also for  1 α= , representing the 
classical case denoted by  i(n) Φ  in the text. From the first order conditions of signatories we 
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[14] in the text requires  1g / k α> −  where 
'' S '' S
ii g: B( x( ,n )/B( x( ,n 1 ) =α α −  and 
22 k: n /(n 1 ) =− . For welfare function [7], g=1 since 
'' Bb =− . Thus, g/k 1/k =  and therefore 
()
2 (g/k)/ n 2 (n 1) /n 0 ∂∂ = ⋅ −> . For welfare function [8], g=
22 kn / ( n 1 ) =−  and hence [14] 
requires  0 α>  which is satisfied in any case. 
Appendix 4 
A sufficient condition that global emissions decrease if we lower α is that individual emis-
sions, 
S
i x , decrease or remain constant when lowering α since 
* n( ) α  increases. For welfare 
function [7], we set  i(, n ) 0 Φα = in [A6] and solve for n which gives two solutions: 
[A9] 
* 2( ) 32
n( )




where the first with “+” is the desired solution. Clearly, 
* n( ) / 0 ∂α ∂ α <  and 
* n( ) 3 α>  if 
1 α< . Because in the classical case we have 
S*
i x( n 3 ) ( ba d3 ) / b ==⋅ − ⋅  and in the non-classi-
cal case 
S* *
i x (, n () ) ( ba d n () ) / b αα = ⋅ − ⋅ α ⋅ α  (see [A5] above), we require that 
* n( ) 3 α⋅ α >  
and that 
* (n ( ) ) / 0 ∂α ⋅ α ∂ α<  which is easily checked to be true. For welfare function [8], we 
find 
* n e 2.718 =≈  and 
* n( ) e / α= α  and hence 
S* S *
ii x( n) x(, n( ) ) =αα =(b-de ⋅ )/(de ⋅ ).  
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